Cite as: 512 U. S. 339 (1994)
Opinion of Scalia, J.
The class of procedural rights that are not guaranteed by the Constitution (which includes the Due Process Clauses), but that nonetheless are inherently necessary to avoid "a complete miscarriage of justice," or numbered among "the rudimentary demands of fair procedure," is no doubt a small one, if it is indeed not a null set. The guarantee of trial within 120 days of interjurisdictional transfer unless good cause is shown—a provision with no application to prisoners involved with only a single jurisdiction or incarcerated in one of the two States that do not participate in the voluntary IAD compact—simply cannot be among that select class of statutory rights.
As for Hill and Timmreck's reservation of the question whether habeas would be available "in the context of other aggravating circumstances," that seems to me clearly a reference to circumstances that cause additional prejudice to the defendant, thereby elevating the error to a fundamental defect or a denial of rudimentary procedural requirements— not a reference to circumstances that make the trial judge's behavior more willful or egregious. I thus think it wrong to suggest that if only petitioner had not waived his IAD speedy trial rights by failing to assert them in a timely fashion, "aggravating circumstances" might exist. See ante, at 349, 350-351. That says, in effect, that "aggravating circumstances" which can entitle a mere statutory violation to habeas review may consist of the mere fact that the statutory violation was not waived. Surely that sucks the life out of Hill.* Nor do I accept Justice Ginsburg's suggestion that an interest in uniform interpretation of the IAD might
*Many courts, including the Indiana Supreme Court in evaluating this petitioner's claim, see Reed v. State, 491 N. E. 2d 182, 185 (Ind. 1986), have held that a prisoner's waiver of the 120-day limit will prevent violation of the IAD, or will preclude the remedy of dismissal with prejudice. See, e. g., United States v. Odom, 674 F. 2d 228 (CA4 1982). Perhaps, therefore, Justice Ginsburg's effort to decide the jurisdictional issue on as narrow a ground as possible has caused her to decide the merits.
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