Cite as: 512 U. S. 374 (1994)
Stevens, J., dissenting
takings" doctrine that the Holmes dictum 10 kindled has an obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner exemplified. Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair.
This case inaugurates an even more recent judicial innovation than the regulatory takings doctrine: the application of the "unconstitutional conditions" label to a mutually beneficial transaction between a property owner and a city. The Court tells us that the city's refusal to grant Dolan a discretionary benefit infringes her right to receive just compensation for the property interests that she has refused to dedicate to the city "where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit." 11 Although it is well settled that a government cannot deny a benefit on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected interests—"especially [one's] interest in freedom of speech," Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972)—the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine provides an inadequate framework in which to analyze this case.12
10 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S., at 484 (explaining why this portion of the opinion was merely "advisory").
11 Ante, at 385. The Court's entire explanation reads: "Under the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property."
12 Although it has a long history, see Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 451 (1874), the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine has for just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application; it has never been an overarching principle of constitutional law that operates with equal force regardless of the nature of the rights and powers in question. See, e. g., Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70 B. U. L. Rev. 593, 620 (1990) (doctrine is "too crude and too general to provide help in contested cases"); Sullivan, Unconstitutional
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