Cite as: 512 U. S. 415 (1994)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
I
A
To assess the constitutionality of Oregon's scheme, I turn first to this Court's recent opinions in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1 (1991), and TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443 (1993). The Court upheld punitive damage awards in both cases, but indicated that due process imposes an outer limit on remedies of this type. Significantly, neither decision declared any specific procedures or substantive criteria essential to satisfy due process. In Haslip, the Court expressed concerns about "unlimited jury discretion—or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter—in the fixing of punitive damages," but refused to "draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable." 499 U. S., at 18. Regarding the components of "the constitutional calculus," the Court simply referred to "general concerns of reasonableness and [the need for] adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury." Ibid.
And in TXO, a majority agreed that a punitive damage award may be so grossly excessive as to violate the Due Process Clause. 509 U. S., at 453-454, 458 (plurality opinion); id., at 466-467 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 479-480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In the plurality's view, however, "a judgment that is a product" of "fair procedures . . . is entitled to a strong presumption of validity"; this presumption, "persuasive reasons" indicated, "should be irrebuttable, . . . or virtually so." Id., at 457, citing Haslip, 499 U. S., at 24-40 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), and id., at 40-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). The opinion stating the plurality position recalled Haslip's touchstone: A " 'concern [for] reasonableness' " is what due process essentially requires. 509
437
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