Cite as: 512 U. S. 504 (1994)
Thomas, J., dissenting
ment to the regulation entirely superfluous, a disfavored result that should be avoided where possible. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 778 (1988). Cf. also Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992).
Consequently, the Secretary's construction of the community support principle to impose a substantive restriction on the reimbursability of approved educational expenses is inconsistent with the regulation. As such, the construction is unworthy of deference. See, e. g., Stinson, 508 U. S., at 45.
III
For the foregoing reasons, the Secretary acted contrary to law, within the meaning of 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), in construing 42 CFR § 413.85(c) (1993) as denying Medicare providers the right to receive reimbursement for otherwise eligible educational costs simply because the costs had not previously been reimbursed by Medicare. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I respectfully dissent.
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