534
Syllabus
court erred in treating the common-law tests as mere arbitrary restrictions to be disregarded if they stand in the way of recovery on "meritorious" FELA claims. Second, the viability of the court's "genuineness" test is questionable on its own terms, since it cannot appreciably diminish the possibility of unlimited liability for genuine claims of emotional harm, and since it would force judges to make highly subjective determinations concerning the authenticity of particular claims. Third, the court's reliance on foreseeability as a meaningful limitation on liability is misplaced, since all consequences of a negligent act, no matter how far removed, may be foreseen. Finally, the common law does not support the court's unprecedented Carlisle holding, which would impose a duty to avoid creating a stressful work environment, and thereby dramatically expand employers' FELA liability to cover the stresses and strains of everyday employment. Pp. 550-554. (c) Instead, this Court adopts the zone of danger test, which limits recovery for emotional injury to those plaintiffs who either sustain a physical impact as a result of the defendant's negligence or are placed in immediate risk of physical impact by that negligence. This is the only common-law test that exhibits both significant historical support and continuing vitality sufficient to inform the Court's determination of the federal question of what constitutes FELA "negligence" in this context. This test is consistent with FELA's broad remedial goals and with the statute's purpose of alleviating the physical dangers of railroading. Even if respondents are correct that the zone of danger test arbitrarily excludes some emotional injury claims, that test best reconciles the concerns motivating the common-law restrictions on recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress—the potential for a flood of trivial suits, the possibility of fraudulent claims that are difficult to detect, and the specter of unlimited and unpredictable liability—with this Court's FELA jurisprudence. Pp. 554-557. 3. The question whether Gottshall satisfies the zone of danger test was not adequately briefed or argued before this Court, and should be considered by the Court of Appeals on remand. In Carlisle, however, judgment must be entered for Conrail on remand, because Carlisle's work-stress-related claim plainly does not fall within the common law's conception of the zone of danger. Pp. 557-558. 988 F. 2d 355 (first case) and 990 F. 2d 90 (second case), reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 558. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 559.
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