562
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S., at 174, whether one can recover for emotional injury might rest on a variety of subtle and intricate distinctions related to the nature of the injury and the character of the tortious activity." Id., at 568.
. . . . . "[T]he question whether one can recover for emotional injury may not be susceptible to an all-inclusive 'yes' or 'no' answer. As in other areas of law, broad pronouncements in this area may have to bow to the precise application of developing legal principles to the particular facts at hand." Id., at 570.
In deciding the cases now under review, the Court of Appeals endeavored to " 'field the Buell pitch.' " 988 F. 2d 355, 365 (CA3 1993), quoting Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 937 F. 2d 1004, 1009 (CA5 1991).
A
In respondent Gottshall's case, the Court of Appeals first described the various rules state courts have applied to common-law actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 988 F. 2d, at 361-362. That court emphasized, however, that "[d]etermining FELA liability is distinctly a federal question." Id., at 362. State common-law decisions, the Court of Appeals observed, "do not necessarily etch the contours of the federal right," ibid., for the common law that courts develop to fill the FELA's interstices is "federal" in character. See id., at 367.
In addition to the FELA's express abolition of traditional employer defenses, the Court of Appeals next noted, this Court's decisions interpreting the FELA served as path-markers. The Court of Appeals referred to decisions that had relaxed "the strict requirements of causation in common law," id., at 368, citing Rogers, 352 U. S., at 506, broadened the conception of negligence per se, see 988 F. 2d, at 368, citing Kernan, 355 U. S., at 437-439, and generously con-
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