Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 13 (1994)

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606

WILLIAMSON v. UNITED STATES

Scalia, J., concurring

so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3). I quite agree with the Court that a reading of the term "statement" to connote an extended declaration (and which would thereby allow both self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory parts of a declaration to be admitted so long as the declaration in the aggregate was sufficiently inculpatory) is unsupportable. See ante, at 599-600.

Employing the narrower definition of "statement," so that Rule 804(b)(3) allows admission of only those remarks that are individually self-inculpatory, does not, as Justice Kennedy states, "eviscerate the against penal interest exception." Post, at 616 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A statement obviously can be self-inculpatory (in the sense of having so much of a tendency to subject one to criminal liability that a reasonable person would not make it without believing it to be true) without consisting of the confession "I committed X element of crime Y." Consider, for example, a declarant who stated: "On Friday morning, I went into a gunshop and (lawfully) bought a particular type of handgun and particular type of ammunition. I then drove in my 1958 blue Edsel and parked in front of the First City Bank with the keys in the ignition and the driver's door ajar. I then went inside, robbed the bank, and shot the security guard." Although the declarant has not confessed to any element of a crime in the first two sentences, those statements in context are obviously against his penal interest, and I have no doubt that a trial judge could properly admit them.

Moreover, a declarant's statement is not magically transformed from a statement against penal interest into one that is inadmissible merely because the declarant names another person or implicates a possible codefendant. For example, if a lieutenant in an organized crime operation described the inner workings of an extortion and protection racket, naming

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