Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 23 (1994)

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Cite as: 512 U. S. 687 (1994)

Opinion of the Court

turned out differently, see 489 U. S., at 14-15 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id., at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment), and language in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U. S., at 673, and Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S., at 608, purporting to rely on the breadth of the statutory schemes would have been mere surplusage. Indeed, under the dissent's theory, if New York were to pass a law providing school buses only for children attending Christian day schools, we would be constrained to uphold the statute against Establishment Clause attack until faced by a request from a non-Christian family for equal treatment under the patently unequal law. Cf. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S., at 17 (upholding school bus service provided all pupils). And to end on the point with which Justice Scalia begins, the license he takes in suggesting that the Court holds the Satmar sect to be New York's established church, see post, at 732, is only one symptom of his inability to accept the fact that this Court has long held that the First Amendment reaches more than classic, 18th-century establishments. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S., at 492-495.

Our job, of course, would be easier if the dissent's position had prevailed with the Framers and with this Court over the years. An Establishment Clause diminished to the dimensions acceptable to Justice Scalia could be enforced by a few simple rules, and our docket would never see cases requiring the application of a principle like neutrality toward religion as well as among religious sects. But that would be as blind to history as to precedent, and the difference between Justice Scalia and the Court accordingly turns on the Court's recognition that the Establishment Clause does comprehend such a principle and obligates courts to exercise the judgment necessary to apply it.

In these cases we are clearly constrained to conclude that the statute before us fails the test of neutrality. It delegates a power this Court has said "ranks at the very apex of

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