Cite as: 512 U. S. 687 (1994)
Scalia, J., dissenting
The Court's demand for "up front" assurances of a neutral system is at war with both traditional accommodation doctrine and the judicial role. As we have described, supra, at 744, Congress's earliest accommodations exempted duties paid by specific churches on particular items. See, e. g., 6 Stat. 346 (1826) (exempting vestments imported by "bishop of Bardstown"). Moreover, most efforts at accommodation seek to solve a problem that applies to members of only one or a few religions. Not every religion uses wine in its sacraments, but that does not make an exemption from Prohibition for sacramental wine use impermissible, accord, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S., at 561, n. 2 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment), nor does it require the State granting such an exemption to explain in advance how it will treat every other claim for dispensation from its controlled-substances laws. Likewise, not every religion uses peyote in its services, but we have suggested that legislation which exempts the sacramental use of peyote from generally applicable drug laws is not only permissible, but desirable, see Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 890 (1990), without any suggestion that some "up front" legislative guarantee of equal treatment for sacramental substances used by other sects must be provided. The record is clear that the necessary guarantee can and will be provided, after the fact, by the courts. See, e. g., Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., supra (rejecting claim that peyote exemption requires marijuana exemption for Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church); Olsen v. Iowa, 808 F. 2d 652 (CA8 1986) (same); Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 459 F. 2d 415 (CA9 1972) (accepting claim that peyote exemption for Native American Church requires peyote exemption for other religions that use that substance in their sacraments).5
5 The Court likens its demand for "up front" assurances to the Court's focus on the narrowness of the statute it struck down in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1 (1989). See ante, at 708. Texas Monthly
747
Page: Index Previous 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007