Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 39 (1994)

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Cite as: 512 U. S. 753 (1994)

Opinion of Scalia, J.

tors' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983). Respondents, on the other hand, contended for what has come to be known as "intermediate scrutiny" (midway between the "strict scrutiny" demanded for content-based regulation of speech and the "rational basis" standard that is applied—under the Equal Protection Clause—to government regulation of non-speech activities). See, e. g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, ante, at 642. That standard, applicable to so-called "time, place, and manner regulations" of speech, provides that the regulations are permissible so long as they "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Perry, supra, at 45. The Court adopts neither of these, but creates, brand new for this abortion-related case, an additional standard that is (supposedly) "somewhat more stringent," ante, at 765, than intermediate scrutiny, yet not as "rigorous," ibid., as strict scrutiny. The Court does not give this new standard a name, but perhaps we could call it intermediate-intermediate scrutiny. The difference between it and intermediate scrutiny (which the Court acknowledges is inappropriate for injunctive restrictions on speech) is frankly too subtle for me to describe, so I must simply recite it: Whereas intermediate scrutiny requires that the restriction be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest," the new standard requires that the restriction "burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest." Ibid.

I shall discuss the Court's mode of applying this supposedly new standard presently, but first I must remark upon the peculiar manner in which the standard was devised. The Court begins, in Part II of the opinion, by considering petitioners' contention that, since the restriction is content based, strict scrutiny should govern. It rejects the premise, and hence rejects the conclusion. It then proceeds, in Part III, to examination of respondents' contention that plain old

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