Cite as: 512 U. S. 753 (1994)
Opinion of Scalia, J.
sponse to threats by the originally named parties (including petitioners here) that they would " '[p]hysically close down abortion mills,' " "bloc[k] access to clinics," "ignore the law of the State," and "shut down a clinic." Permanent Injunction Findings of Fact ¶¶ 2, 5, 7, 8, App. 6-7. That original injunction prohibited petitioners from:
"1) trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress into or egress from any facility at which abortions are performed in Brevard and Seminole County Florida; "2) physically abusing persons entering, leaving, working or using any services of any facility at which abortions are performed in Brevard and Seminole County, Florida; and "3) attempting or directing others to take any of the actions described in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above." Id., at 9.
According to the Court, the state court imposed the later injunction's "restrictions on petitioner[s'] . . . antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the court's original order." Ante, at 763. Surprisingly, the Court accepts this reason as valid, without asking whether the court's findings of fact support it—whether, that is, the acts of which petitioners stood convicted were violations of the original injunction.
The Court simply takes this on faith—even though violation of the original injunction is an essential part of the reasoning whereby it approves portions of the amended injunction, even though petitioners denied any violation of the original injunction, even though the utter lack of proper basis for the other challenged portions of the injunction hardly inspires confidence that the lower courts knew what they were doing, and even though close examination of the factual basis for essential conclusions is the usual practice in First Amendment cases, see Claiborne Hardware, 458 U. S.,
805
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