900
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
In fact, it should be clear that the assumptions that have guided the Court reflect only one possible understanding of effective exercise of the franchise, an understanding based on the view that voters are "represented" only when they choose a delegate who will mirror their views in the legislative halls. See generally H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 60-91 (1967).7 But it is certainly possible to construct a theory of effective political participation that would accord greater importance to voters' ability to influence, rather than control, elections. And especially in a two-party system such as ours, the influence of a potential "swing" group of voters composing 10% to 20% of the electorate in a given district can be considerable.8 Even such a focus on practical influence, however, is not a necessary component of the definition of the "effective" vote. Some conceptions of representative government may primarily emphasize the formal value of the vote as a mechanism for participation in
7 Indeed, the assumptions underpinning the Court's conclusions largely parallel principles that John Stuart Mill advanced in proposing a system of proportional representation as an electoral reform in Great Britain. See J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861). In Mill's view, a just system of representative government required an electoral system that ensured "a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives." Id., at 133. To Mill, a system that allowed a portion of the population that constituted a majority in each district to control the election of all representatives and to defeat the minority's choice of candidates was unjust because it operated to produce a "complete disfranchisement of minorities." Id., at 132.
8 We ourselves have tacitly acknowledged that our current view of what constitutes an effective vote may be subject to reevaluation, or at least that it may not provide an exclusive definition of effective voting power, as we repeatedly have reserved the question whether a vote dilution claim may be brought for failure to create minority "influence" districts. See, e. g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 154 (1993) (citing cases). Cf. Bandemer, supra, at 132 (noting that "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections"); Gingles, supra, at 99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (suggesting that the Court should not focus solely on a minority group's ability to elect representatives in assessing the effectiveness of the group's votes).
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