Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 80 (1994)

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Cite as: 512 U. S. 874 (1994)

Blackmun, J., dissenting

their proposed benchmark is reasonable and workable. One indication of a benchmark's reasonableness is its grounding in history, custom, or practice. This consideration will discourage size challenges to traditional single-member executive offices, such as governors and mayors, or even sheriffs or clerks of court. By tradition and practice, these executive positions are occupied by one person, so plaintiffs could rarely point to an objectively reasonable alternative size that has any foundation in the past or present. Cf. The Federalist No. 69, p. 415 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) ("[T]he executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate"). The sole commissioner, by contrast, holds plenary legislative, as well as executive, power. Ga. Code Ann. § 36-5-22.1 (1993). A one-member legislature, far from being the norm, is an anomaly. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit, while permitting § 2 challenges to the practice of electing a sole commissioner, has held that this provision cannot be used to alter the practice of electing a single person to offices such as lieutenant governor, sheriff, probate judge, and tax collector. See Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F. 2d 246, 251 (1987); United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 850 F. 2d 1430, 1432, n. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1030 (1989).5

Additionally, every successful vote-dilution challenge will

be based on the "totality of the circumstances," often including the lingering effects of past discrimination. S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-30. Not every racial or language minority that constitutes 5% of the population has a claim to have a governing authority expanded to 20 members in order to give them an opportunity to elect a representative. Instead, the voters would have to prove that a 20-5 Of course, this is not to suggest that single-member executive offices are not within the scope of § 2, see Houston Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney General of Tex., 501 U. S. 419, 425-428 (1991), but only that they are not generally susceptible to size challenges under § 2.

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