Cite as: 512 U. S. 967 (1994)
Opinion of the Court
relevant mitigating evidence"); see Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 361 (1993).
The eligibility decision fits the crime within a defined classification. Eligibility factors almost of necessity require an answer to a question with a factual nexus to the crime or the defendant so as to "make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." Arave, supra, at 471 (internal quotation marks omitted). The selection decision, on the other hand, requires individualized sentencing and must be expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to assure an assessment of the defendant's culpability. The objectives of these two inquiries can be in some tension, at least when the inquiries occur at the same time. See Romano v. Oklahoma, ante, at 6 (referring to "two somewhat contradictory tasks"). There is one principle common to both decisions, however: The State must ensure that the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 189 (1976) ( joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (procedures must "minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"). That is the controlling objective when we examine eligibility and selection factors for vagueness. Indeed, it is the reason that eligibility and selection factors (at least in some sentencing schemes) may not be "too vague." Walton, supra, at 654; see Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356, 361-364 (1988).
Because "the proper degree of definition" of eligibility and selection factors often "is not susceptible of mathematical precision," our vagueness review is quite deferential. Walton, supra, at 655; see Gregg, supra, at 193-194 (factors "are by necessity somewhat general"). Relying on the basic principle that a factor is not unconstitutional if it has some "common-sense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of understanding," Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment), we
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