Cite as: 512 U. S. 967 (1994)
Blackmun, J., dissenting
spite the critical—even decisive—role these factors play in the determination of who actually receives the death penalty, jurors are given no guidance in how to consider them. We have stated: "A vague aggravating factor used in the weighing process . . . creates the risk that the jury will treat the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty than he might otherwise be by relying upon the existence of an illusory circumstance." Stringer, 503 U. S., at 235.
The majority introduces a novel distinction between "propositional" and "nonpropositional" aggravating circumstances. Ante, at 974. The majority acknowledges that the "distinction between the two is not always clear," ante, at 975; I find it largely illusory. The Court suggests, but does not make explicit, that propositional factors are those that "require a yes or a no answer to a specific question," while nonpropositional factors are those that "only poin[t] the sentencer to a subject matter." Ibid. Presumably, then, asking the jury whether "the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" would be a propositional aggravator, while directing the sentencer to "the presence or absence of any especial heinousness, atrocity, or cruelty" would be a nonpropositional factor. I am at a loss to see how the mere rephrasing does anything more to channel or guide jury discretion. Nor does this propositional/nonpropositional distinction appear to play any role in the Court's decision. The Court nowhere discloses specifically where the line is drawn, on which side of it the three challenged factors fall, and what relevance, if any, this distinction should have to the Court's future vagueness analysis.1
1 Nor does it matter for Eighth Amendment purposes that California uses one set of factors (the § 190.2 "special circumstances") to determine eligibility and another set (the § 190.3 "relevant factors") in the weighing or selection process. Whether an aggravator is used for narrowing, or for weighing, or for both, it cannot be impermissibly vague. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U. S. 463 (1993) (vagueness analysis applied to aggravating factor, even though remaining aggravating factor made defendant death
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