Cite as: 513 U. S. 1 (1994)
Stevens, J., dissenting
re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991); In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989). As we concluded in Sindram:
"The goal of fairly dispensing justice . . . is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests. Pro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources because they are not subject to the financial considerations—filing fees and attorney's fees—that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions. The risks of abuse are particularly acute with respect to applications for extraordinary relief, since such petitions are not subject to any time limitations and, theoretically, could be filed at any time without limitation. In order to prevent frivolous petitions for extraordinary relief from unsettling the fair administration of justice, the Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have abused the system." 498 U. S., at 179-180 (citation omitted).
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
Having already explained why the 1991 amendment to this Court's Rule 39 was both unnecessary and ill considered,1 and having dissented from each of the dispositions cited by the Court today,2 I would only add that I remain convinced that the views expressed in those dissents are correct. Given the current state of our docket, there is a peculiar irony in the Court's reliance, as a basis for singling out this
1 In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U. S. 13, 15 (1991) (dissenting opinion).
2 See In re Anderson, 511 U. S. 364, 366 (1994); In re Demos, 500 U. S. 16, 17-19 (1991); In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177, 180-183 (1991); In re Mc-Donald, 489 U. S. 180, 185-188 (1989). See also Day v. Day, 510 U. S. 1, 3 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U. S. 1067, 1069-1072 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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