Cite as: 513 U. S. 150 (1995)
Breyer, J., dissenting
on the probative force (if true) of that declarant's statement. The "timing" circumstance (the fact that a prior consistent statement was made after a motive to lie arose) may diminish probative force, but it does not diminish reliability. Thus, from a hearsay perspective, the timing of a prior consistent statement is basically beside the point.
At the same time, one can find a hearsay-related reason why the drafters might have decided to restrict the Rule to a particular category of prior consistent statements. Juries have trouble distinguishing between the rehabilitative and substantive use of the kind of prior consistent statements listed in Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Judges may give instructions limiting the use of such prior consistent statements to a rehabilitative purpose, but, in practice, juries nonetheless tend to consider them for their substantive value. See 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 801(d) (1)(B)[01], p. 801-188 (1994) ("[A]s a practical matter, the jury in all probability would misunderstand or ignore a limiting instruction [with respect to the class of prior consistent statements covered by the Rule] anyway, so there is no good reason for giving one"). It is possible that the Advisory Committee made them "nonhearsay" for that reason, i. e., as a concession "more of experience than of logic." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 773 (also noting that the witness is available for cross-examination in the courtroom in any event). If there was a reason why the drafters excluded from Rule 801(d)(1)(B)'s scope other kinds of prior consistent statements (used for rehabilitation), perhaps it was that the drafters concluded that those other statements caused jury confusion to a lesser degree. On this rationale, however, there is no basis for distinguishing between premotive and post-motive statements, for the confusion with respect to each would very likely be the same.
In sum, because the Rule addresses a hearsay problem and one can find a reason, unrelated to the premotive rule, for
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