Cite as: 513 U. S. 196 (1995)
Souter, J., dissenting
prohibited or limited in terms that speak of waiver expressly. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U. S. 255 (1993); Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1 (1959). Still, the majority seems to assume that the express-waiver cases describe the only circumstances in which the recognition of waiver is fore-closed, and since the Rules in question here say nothing about "waiver" as such, the majority finds that fact really to be the end of the matter.
If there were nothing more to go on here, I, too, would join the majority in relying on the fallback rule of permissible waiver. But there is more to go on. There is, indeed, good reason to believe that Congress rejected the general rule of waivability when it passed the Rules in issue here, and once the evidence of such congressional intent is squarely faced, we have no business but to respect it (or deflect it by applying some constitutionally mandated requirement of clear statement). There is, of course, no claim in this case that Congress should be hobbled by any clear statement rule, and the result is that we are bound to respect the intent that the Advisory Committee's Notes to the congressionally enacted Rules reveal. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U. S. 594, 614-615 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (citing cases in which Advisory Committee's Notes are taken as authoritative evidence of intent).
The fact underlying those Notes, and the fact of which all congressional and judicial action must take account in dealing with the possible evidentiary significance of plea discussions, is that the federal judicial system could not possibly litigate every civil and criminal case filed in the courts. The consequence of this is that plea bargaining is an accepted feature of the criminal justice system, and, "[p]roperly administered, it is to be encouraged." Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 260 (1971). Thus the Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 410 explained that "[e]xclusion of offers to plead guilty or nolo has as its purpose the promotion of disposition of criminal cases by compromise." 28 U. S. C. App.,
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