Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 32 (1995)

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296

ALLIED-BRUCE TERMINIX COS. v. DOBSON

Thomas, J., dissenting

Arbitration Law?, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 385, 401-403, and n. 93 (1992).

Quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984), Justice O'Connor nonetheless acquiesces in the majority's judgment "because there is no 'special justification' to overrule Southland." Ante, at 284. Even under this approach, the necessity of "preserv[ing] state autonomy in state courts," ibid., seems sufficient to me.

But suppose that stare decisis really did require us to abide by Southland's holding that § 2 applies to the States. The doctrine still would not require us to follow Southland's suggestion that § 2 requires the specific enforcement of the arbitration agreements that it covers. We accord no precedential weight to mere dicta, and this latter suggestion was wholly unnecessary to the decision in Southland. The arbitration agreement at issue there, if valid at all with respect to the particular claims in dispute, clearly was subject to specific performance under state law; indeed, the state trial court had already compelled arbitration for all the other claims raised in the complaint. See Southland, 465 U. S., at 4; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 1281.2, 1281.4 (West 1982). Accordingly, the only question properly before the Southland Court was whether § 2 pre-empted a separate state law declaring the arbitration agreement "void" as applied to the remaining claims. See 465 U. S., at 10 (discussing Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 31512 (West 1977)). The same can be said for Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483 (1987), in which we again held that § 2 pre-empted a California statute that (as we had observed in a prior case, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U. S. 117, 133 (1973)) made certain arbitration clauses "unenforceable." We have subsequently reserved judgment about the extent to which state courts must enforce arbitration agreements through the mechanisms that §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA prescribe for the federal courts. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489

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