Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U.S. 374, 26 (1995)

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Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995)

Opinion of the Court

"held shares in the old Bank of the United States; but the privileges of the government were not imparted by that circumstance to the bank. The United States was not a party to suits brought by or against the bank in the sense of the constitution." Id., at 908. But it does not contradict those statements to hold that a corporation is an agency of the Government, for purposes of the constitutional obligations of Government rather than the "privileges of the government," when the State has specifically created that corporation for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and not merely holds some shares but controls the operation of the corporation through its appointees.

Respondent also invokes our decision in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 (1974), which found the Consolidated Rail Corporation, or Conrail, not to be a federal instrumentality, despite the President's power to appoint, directly or indirectly, 8 of its 15 directors. See id., at 152, n. 40; Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, § 301, 87 Stat. 1004. But we specifically observed in that case that the directors were placed on the board to protect the United States' interest "in assuring payment of the obligations guaranteed by the United States," and that "[f]ull voting control . . . will shift to the shareholders if federal obligations fall below 50% of Conrail's indebtedness." 419 U. S., at 152. Moreover, we noted, "[t]he responsibilities of the federal directors are not different from those of the other directors— to operate Conrail at a profit for the benefit of its shareholders," ibid.—which contrasts with the public interest "goals" set forth in Amtrak's charter, see 45 U. S. C. § 501a. Amtrak is worlds apart from Conrail: The Government exerts its control not as a creditor but as a policymaker, and no provision exists that will automatically terminate control upon termination of a temporary financial interest.5

5 Section 543(c) purports to divide the authority to select seven directors between the common stockholders and the preferred stockholders upon conversion of one-fourth or more of Amtrak's outstanding preferred stock

399

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