Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 7 (1995)

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

510

HARRIS v. ALABAMA

Opinion of the Court

tencing power resides with the jury in most States, we made clear that the "Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws." Id., at 464. We therefore rejected the contention that "placing the responsibility on a trial judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is so fundamentally at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency that Florida must be required to alter its scheme and give final authority to the jury to make the life-or-death decision." Id., at 465; see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 648 (1990); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 745 (1990).

Asserting that the death penalty serves no function in "rehabilitation," "incapacitation," or "deterren[ce]," Justice Stevens argues that a jury "should bear the responsibility to express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death in particular cases." Post, at 517, 518 (internal quotation marks omitted). What purpose is served by capital punishment and how a State should implement its capital punishment scheme—to the extent that those questions involve only policy issues—are matters over which we, as judges, have no jurisdiction. Our power of judicial review legitimately extends only to determine whether the policy choices of the community, expressed through its legislative enactments, comport with the Constitution. As we have noted elsewhere, "while we have an obligation to insure that constitutional bounds are not overreached, we may not act as judges as we might as legislators." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 174-175 (1976) ( joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).

In various opinions on the Florida statute we have spoken favorably of the deference that a judge must accord the jury verdict under Florida law. While rejecting an ex post facto challenge in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 294 (1977), we noted the "crucial protection" provided by the standard of Tedder v. State, supra, at 910. In the same fashion, in

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007