Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 27 (1995)

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Cite as: 513 U. S. 561 (1995)

Thomas, J., dissenting

letter, or communication, written or by radio or television." To read one word in a long list as controlling the meaning of all the other words would defy common sense; doing so would prevent Congress from giving effect to expansive words in a list whenever they are combined with one word with a more restricted meaning. Section 2(10)'s very exhaustiveness suggests that "prospectus" is merely the first item in a long list of covered documents, rather than a brooding omnipresence whose meaning cabins that of all the following words. The majority also argues that a broad definition of prospectus makes much of § 2(10) redundant. See ante, at 574-575. But the majority fails to see that "communication, written or by radio or television," is a catchall. It operates as a safety net that Congress used to sweep up anything it had forgotten to include in its definition. This is a technique Congress employed in several other provisions of the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 77b(1) ("term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security' "); § 77b(9) ("term 'write' or 'written' shall include printed, lithographed, or any means of graphic communication"); § 78c(a)(6) ("term 'bank' means (A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United States, (B) a member bank of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any other banking institution"). In fact, it is the majority's approach that creates redundancies. The majority cannot account for Congress' decision to begin its definition of "prospectus" with the term "prospectus," which is then followed by the rest of § 2(10)'s list. As a result, the majority must conclude that the use of the term is a "partial circularity," ante, at 576, a reading that deprives the word of its meaning.

B

The majority correctly argues that other sections of the 1933 Act employ a narrower understanding of "prospectus"

587

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