136
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
to operation of a legislative scheme; but it does not add features that will achieve the statutory "purposes" more effectively. Every statute purposes, not only to achieve certain ends, but also to achieve them by particular means—and there is often a considerable legislative battle over what those means ought to be. The withholding of agency authority is as significant as the granting of it, and we have no right to play favorites between the two. Construing the LHWCA as liberally as can be, we cannot find that the Director is "adversely affected or aggrieved" within the meaning of § 921(c).
* * *
For these reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.
So ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment.
The Court holds that the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs of the United States Department of Labor (OWCP) lacks standing under § 21(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., to seek judicial review of LHWCA claim determinations. Before amendment of the LHWCA in 1972, the Act's administrator had authority to seek review of LHWCA claim determinations in the courts of appeals. The Court reads the 1972 amendments as divesting the Act's administrator of access to federal appellate tribunals formerly open to the administrator's petitions. The practical effect of the Court's ruling is to order a disparity between two compensatory schemes— the LHWCA and the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 83 Stat. 792, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq.—measures that Congress intended to work in essentially the same way.
Significantly, however, the Court observes that our precedent "certainly establish[es] that Congress could have con-
Page: Index Previous 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007