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Stevens, J., dissenting
titions for certiorari, frivolous. As we told petitioner earlier this Term, "[t]he goal of fairly dispensing justice . . . is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Petitioner's abuse of petitions for certiorari has occurred only in noncriminal cases, and we limit our sanction accordingly. This order therefore will not prevent petitioner from filing a petition for certiorari to challenge criminal sanctions that might be imposed upon him. But like other similar orders we have issued, see In re Sassower, 510 U. S. 4 (1993); Day v. Day, 510 U. S. 1 (1993); Demos v. Storrie, 507 U. S. 290 (1993); Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992), this order will allow the Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our process.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
A simple denial would adequately serve the laudable goal of conserving the Court's "limited resources." Ante this page. See generally In re Whitaker, 513 U. S. 1, 3 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
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