330
Stevens, J., dissenting
Nor does anything in the 1986 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code alter my analysis.19 The primary effect of those amendments was to give the bankruptcy judges the power to issue orders sua sponte.20 The 1986 amendments, therefore, do not reflect any expansion of the power of Bankruptcy Judges to enjoin other courts.
The Bankruptcy Judge's error with respect to this injunction thus seems clear, and the injunction falls, therefore, within the exception recognized by the majority for injunctions with only a "frivolous pretense to validity." I recognize, of course, that one may legitimately question the "frivolousness" of the injunction in light of the Fourth Circuit's upholding the very injunction at issue in this case, see Willis v. Celotex Corp., 978 F. 2d 146 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 1030 (1993), and the disagreement of a substantial number of my colleagues. In my view, however, the Bankruptcy Judge's error is sufficiently plain that the Court of Appeals was justified in allowing the Edwards to collect on their bond.21
19 See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088. With respect to 11 U. S. C. § 105, the 1986 amendments added the second sentence of the current version of § 105(a). See 100 Stat. 3097.
20 The only relevant legislative history regarding the changes to § 105(a) is contained in Senator Hatch's view that the amendment "allows a bankruptcy court to take any action on its own, or to make any necessary determination to prevent an abuse of process and to help expedite a case in a proper and justified manner." 132 Cong. Rec. 28610 (1986).
21 Neither of the cases cited by the majority, ante, at 312-313, n. 9, provides any reason to conclude otherwise. As the majority notes, those cases hold that the bankruptcy trustee may recover from a third party (e. g., the Edwards) funds transferred from the debtor (e. g., Celotex) to another (e. g., Northbrook) for the benefit of that third party. Both cases, however, make clear that the obligation of the Northbrook-like guarantor (a bank in each case) to pay the third party was not at issue. See In re Compton Corp., 831 F. 2d 586, 590 (1987) ("[T]he trustee is not attempting to set aside the post petition payments by [the bank] to [the third party] under the letter of credit as a preference"), modified on other grounds, 835
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