McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 21 (1995)

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354

McINTYRE v. OHIO ELECTIONS COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

on the prophylactic effect of requiring identification of the source of corporate advertising,18 that footnote did not necessarily apply to independent communications by an individual like Mrs. McIntyre.

Our reference in the Bellotti footnote to the "prophylactic effect" of disclosure requirements cited a portion of our earlier opinion in Buckley, in which we stressed the importance of providing "the electorate with information 'as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate.' " 424 U. S., at 66. We observed that the "sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office." Id., at 67. Those comments concerned contributions to the candidate or expenditures authorized by the candidate or his responsible agent. They had no reference to the kind of independent activity pursued by Mrs. Mc-Intyre. Required disclosures about the level of financial support a candidate has received from various sources are supported by an interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption that has no application to this case.

tection of corporate speech, or address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment." Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 777-778.

In a footnote to that passage, we continued: "Nor is there any occasion to consider in this case whether, under different circumstances, a justification for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as applied to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied to corporations, unions, or like entities." Id., at 777-778, n. 13.

18 "Corporate advertising, unlike some methods of participation in political campaigns, is likely to be highly visible. Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 66-67; United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 625-626 (1954). In addition, we emphasized in Buckley the prophylactic effect of requiring that the source of communication be disclosed. 424 U. S., at 67." Id., at 792, n. 32.

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