Cite as: 514 U. S. 334 (1995)
Scalia, J., dissenting
Ann. § 1-1420 (1992), and as does the Federal Government where advertising relating to candidates for federal office is concerned, see 2 U. S. C. § 441d(a). Such a universal 3 and long-established American legislative practice must be given precedence, I think, over historical and academic speculation regarding a restriction that assuredly does not go to the heart of free speech.
It can be said that we ignored a tradition as old, and almost as widespread, in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989), where we held unconstitutional a state law prohibiting desecration of the United States flag. See also United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310 (1990). But those cases merely
Code Ann. § 3599.09(A) (1988); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 1840 (Supp. 1995); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 260.522 (1991); 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3258 (1994); R. I. Gen. Laws § 17-23-2 (1988); S. C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1354 (Supp. 1993); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 12-25-4.1 (Supp. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-120 (Supp. 1994); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 255.001 (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 20- 14-24 (Supp. 1994); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2022 (1982); Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-1014 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.510 (Supp. 1994); W. Va. Code § 3-8-12 (1994); Wis. Stat. § 11.30 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. Stat. § 22-25-110 (1992).
Courts have declared some of these laws unconstitutional in recent years, relying upon our decision in Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960). See, e. g., State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1989); State v. North Dakota Ed. Assn., 262 N. W. 2d 731 (N. D. 1978); People v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 351 N. Y. S. 2d 978 (Sup.), aff'd, 44 App. Div. 2d 663, 354 N. Y. S. 2d 129 (1974). Other decisions, including all pre-Talley decisions I am aware of, have upheld the laws. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A. 2d 137 (1944); State v. Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P. 2d 362 (1936); State v. Babst, 104 Ohio St. 167, 135 N. E. 525 (1922).
3 It might be accurate to say that, insofar as the judicially unconstrained judgment of American legislatures is concerned, approval of the law before us here is universal. California, although it had enacted an election disclosure requirement as early as 1901, see Act of Mar. 15, 1901, ch. 138, § 1, 1901 Cal. Stats. 297, abandoned its law (then similar to Ohio's) in 1983, see Act of Sept. 11, 1983, ch. 668, 1983 Cal. Stats. 2621, after a California Court of Appeal, relying primarily on our decision in Talley, had declared the provision unconstitutional, see Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1042 (1981).
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