Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 22 (1995)

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Cite as: 514 U. S. 386 (1995)

Breyer, J., dissenting

of appeals "within 60 days after its entry." 28 U. S. C. § 2344. The Court concluded, on the basis of precedent, that the filing of a proper petition for reconsideration, "within the period allotted for judicial review of the original order . . . tolls the period for judicial review of the original order." 482 U. S., at 279. That order can "be appealed to the courts . . . after the petition for reconsideration is denied." Ibid. See also id., at 284-285.

In my view, we should interpret the INA as calling for tolling, just as we interpreted the Hobbs Act in Locomotive Engineers. For one thing, the appeals time limit language in the INA is similar to that in the Hobbs Act. Like the Hobbs Act, the INA does not mention tolling explicitly; it simply says that "a petition for review may be filed not later than 90 days after the date of the issuance of the final deportation order." INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V). More importantly, the INA explicitly states that the "procedure prescribed by, and all the provisions of [the Hobbs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2341 et seq.,] shall apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation." INA § 106(a), 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a). This statutory phrase is not conclusive because it is followed by several exceptions, one of which is the subsection setting the "[t]ime for filing [a] petition" for review. INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(1). But, the context suggests that the reason for calling the latter clause an exception lies in the number of days permitted for filing— 90 in the INA, as opposed to 60 in the Hobbs Act. Nothing in the language of § 106(a) (which was amended three years after Locomotive Engineers, see Immigration Act of 1990, § 545(b), 104 Stat. 5065) suggests any further exception in respect to tolling.

Finally, interpreting the INA and the Hobbs Act consistently makes it easier for the bar to understand, and to follow, these highly technical rules. With consistent rules, a non-immigration-specialist lawyer (say, a lawyer used to working

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