Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 17 (1995)

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Cite as: 514 U. S. 419 (1995)

Opinion of the Court

patory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict. The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpa-tory evidence should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.8

Third, we note that, contrary to the assumption made by the Court of Appeals, 5 F. 3d, at 818, once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional error there is no need for further harmless-error review. Assuming, arguendo, that a harmless-error enquiry were to apply, a Bagley error could not be treated as harmless, since "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different," 473 U. S., at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id., at 685 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), necessarily entails the conclusion that the suppression must have had " 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict,' " Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 623 (1993), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 776 (1946). This is amply confirmed by the development of the respective governing standards. Although

8 This rule is clear, and none of the Brady cases has ever suggested that sufficiency of evidence (or insufficiency) is the touchstone. And yet the dissent appears to assume that Kyles must lose because there would still have been adequate evidence to convict even if the favorable evidence had been disclosed. See post, at 463 (possibility that Beanie planted evidence "is perfectly consistent" with Kyles's guilt), ibid. ("[T]he jury could well have believed [portions of the defense theory] and yet have condemned petitioner because it could not believe that all four of the eyewitnesses were similarly mistaken"), post, at 468 (the Brady evidence would have left two prosecution witnesses "totally untouched"), 469 (Brady evidence "can be logically separated from the incriminating evidence that would have remained unaffected").

435

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