Cite as: 514 U. S. 476 (1995)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
phasizing high alcohol strength (which is apparently the policy in some other western nations), or limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors, which is the segment of the market that allegedly is threatened with a strength war. We agree that the availability of these options, all of which could advance the Government's asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to respondent's First Amendment rights, indicates that § 205(e)(2) is more extensive than necessary.
IV
In sum, although the Government may have a substantial interest in suppressing strength wars in the beer market, the FAAA's countervailing provisions prevent § 205(e)(2) from furthering that purpose in a direct and material fashion. The FAAA's defects are further highlighted by the availability of alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment's protections for commercial speech. Because we find that § 205(e)(2) fails the Central Hudson test, we affirm the decision of the court below.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment.
Although I agree with the Court's persuasive demonstration that this statute does not serve the Government's purported interest in preventing "strength wars," I write separately because I am convinced that the constitutional infirmity in the statute is more patent than the Court's opinion indicates. Instead of relying on the formulaic approach announced in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), I believe the Court should ask whether the justification for allowing more regulation of commercial speech than other speech has any application to this unusual statute.
In my opinion the "commercial speech doctrine" is unsuited to this case, because the Federal Alcohol Administra-
491
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