United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 70 (1995)

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618

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ

Breyer, J., dissenting

the statute at hand turn on the presence or absence of findings. Because Congress did make findings (though not until after Lopez was prosecuted), doing so would appear to elevate form over substance. See Pub. L. 103-322, §§ 320904 (2)(F), (G), 108 Stat. 2125, 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(q)(1)(F), (G). In addition, despite the Court of Appeals' suggestion to

the contrary, see 2 F. 3d 1342, 1365 (CA5 1993), there is no special need here for a clear indication of Congress' rationale. The statute does not interfere with the exercise of state or local authority. Cf., e. g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 227-228 (1989) (requiring clear statement for abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity). Moreover, any clear statement rule would apply only to determine Congress' intended result, not to clarify the source of its authority or measure the level of consideration that went into its decision, and here there is no doubt as to which activities Congress intended to regulate. See ibid.; id., at 233 (Scalia, J., concurring) (to subject States to suits for money damages, Congress need only make that intent clear, and need not refer explicitly to the Eleventh Amendment); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 243, n. 18 (1983) (Congress need not recite the constitutional provision that authorizes its action).

II

Applying these principles to the case at hand, we must ask whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and interstate commerce. Or, to put the question in the language of the explicit finding that Congress made when it amended this law in 1994: Could Congress rationally have found that "violent crime in school zones," through its effect on the "quality of education," significantly (or substantially) affects "interstate" or "foreign commerce"? 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(q)(1)(F), (G). As long as one views the commerce connection, not as a "technical legal conception," but as "a practical one," Swift & Co. v. United States, 196

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