OCTOBER TERM, 1994
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit
No. 94-560. Argued March 22, 1995—Decided May 22, 1995
This case arose out of disputes centered on a "workout" agreement, embodied in four documents, which governs the "working out" of debts owed by respondents—Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI)—to petitioner First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a stock exchange panel. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel, denying that their disagreement with First Options was arbitrable. The arbitrators decided that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits and ruled in First Options' favor. The District Court confirmed the award, but the Court of Appeals reversed. In finding that the dispute was not arbitrable, the Court of Appeals said that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of respondents' motion to vacate the arbitration award.
Held: 1. The arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts. Pp. 942-947. (a) The answer to the narrow question whether the arbitrators or the courts have the primary power to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute's merits is fairly simple. Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, see, e. g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., ante, at 52, so the question "who has the primary power to decide arbitrability" turns upon whether the parties agreed to submit that question to arbitration. If so, then the court should defer to the arbitrator's arbitrability decision. If not, then the court should decide the question independently. These two answers flow inexorably from the fact that arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties. Pp. 942-943.Page: Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
Last modified: October 4, 2007