Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 35 (1995)

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134

MISSOURI v. JENKINS

Thomas, J., concurring

D

The dissent's approval of the District Court's treatment of salary increases is typical of this Court's failure to place limits on the equitable remedial power. The dissent frames the inquiry thus: "The only issue, then, is whether the salary increases ordered by the District Court have been reasonably related to achieving" the goal of remedying a systemwide reduction in student achievement, "keeping in mind the broad discretion enjoyed by the District Court in exercising its equitable powers." Post, at 155. In response to its question, the dissent concludes that "it is difficult to see how the District Court abused its discretion" in either the 1992 or 1993 orders, ibid., and characterizes the lower court's orders as "beyond reproach," post, at 158. When the standard of review is as vague as whether "federal-court decrees . . . directly address and relate to the constitutional violation," Milliken II, 433 U. S., at 281-282, it is difficult to ever find a remedial order "unreasonable." Such criteria provide district courts with little guidance, and provide appellate courts few principles with which to review trial court decisions. If the standard reduces to what one believes is a "fair" remedy, or what vaguely appears to be a good "fit" between violation and remedy, then there is little hope of imposing the constraints on the equity power that the Framers envisioned and that our constitutional system requires.

Contrary to the dissent's conclusion, the District Court's remedial orders are in tension with two commonsense principles. First, the District Court retained jurisdiction over the implementation and modification of the remedial decree, instead of terminating its involvement after issuing its remedy. Although briefly mentioned in Brown II as a temporary measure to overcome local resistance to desegregation, 349 U. S., at 301 ("During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction"), this concept of continuing judicial involvement has permitted the District Courts to revise their remedies constantly in order to reach some broad, ab-

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