Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 46 (1995)

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Cite as: 515 U. S. 70 (1995)

Souter, J., dissenting

including non-instructional personnel—as a part of a school desegregation remedy conflicts with applicable decisions of this court which require that remedial components must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation and be tailored to cure the condition that offends the Constitution?" Pet. for Cert. i.

These questions focus on two discrete issues: the extent to which a district court may look at students' test scores in determining whether a school district has attained partial unitary status as to its Milliken II educational programs, and whether the particular salary increases ordered by the District Court constitute a permissible component of its remedy.

The State did not go beyond these discrete issues, and it framed no broader, foundational question about the validity of the District Court's magnet concept. The Court decides, however, that it can reach that question of its own initiative, and it sees no bar to this course in the provision of this Court's Rule 14.1 that "[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered . . . ." Ante, at 84-85. The broader issue, the Court claims, is "fairly included" in the State's salary question. But that claim does not survive scrutiny.

The standard under Rule 14.1 is quite simple: as the Court recognizes, we have held that an issue is fairly comprehended in a question presented when the issue must be resolved in order to answer the question. See ibid., citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 560, n. 6 (1978); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-552, n. 5 (1980). That should be the end of the matter here, since the State itself concedes that we can answer its salary and test-score questions without addressing the soundness of the magnet element of the District Court's underlying remedial scheme, see Brief for Petitioners 18 ("each question [presented] can be dealt with on its own terms . . ."). While the Court ignores that concession, it is patently correct. There

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