Cite as: 515 U. S. 70 (1995)
Souter, J., dissenting
"The district court, correctly recognizing that at least part of this problem was the consequence of the de jure segregation previously practiced under Missouri constitutional and statutory law, fashioned a remedial plan for the desegregation of the KCMSD . . . ." 19 F. 3d, at 397 (Beam, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
The reality is that the Court today overturns the concurrent factual findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals without having identified any circumstance in the record sufficient to warrant such an extraordinary course of action.
B
To the substantial likelihood that the Court proceeds on erroneous assumptions of fact must be added corresponding errors of law. We have most recently summed up the obligation to correct the condition of de jure segregation by saying that "the duty of a former de jure district is to 'take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.' " Freeman, 503 U. S., at 486, quoting Green, 391 U. S., at 437-438. Although the fashioning of judicial remedies to this end has been left, in the first instance, to the equitable discretion of the district courts, in Milliken I we established an absolute limitation on this exercise of equitable authority. "[W]ithout an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy." Milliken I, 418 U. S., at 745.
The Court proceeds as if there is no question but that this proscription applies to this case. But the proscription does not apply. We are not dealing here with an interdistrict remedy in the sense that Milliken I used the term. In the Milliken I litigation, the District Court had ordered 53 surrounding school districts to be consolidated with the Detroit
167
Page: Index Previous 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007