Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 17 (1995)

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Cite as: 515 U. S. 323 (1995)

O'Connor, J., dissenting

can be little doubt about this point." Burke, supra, at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). We have recognized that "racial discrimination . . . is a fundamental injury to the individual rights of a person." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 661 (1987). Such offense to the rights and dignity of the individual attaches regardless of whether the discrimination is based on race, sex, age, or other suspect characteristics. See, e. g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 265 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("[W]hat-ever the final outcome of a decisional process, the inclusion of race or sex as a consideration within it harms both society and the individual"); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 231 (1983) (Age discrimination "inflict[s] on individual workers the economic and psychological injury accompanying the loss of the opportunity to engage in productive and satisfying occupations"). Thus, prior to 1992, courts generally relied on Threlkeld to hold that damages awarded under the ADEA were excludable from income because they were received on account of personal injuries. See, e. g., Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F. 2d 145 (CA6 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F. 2d 655 (CA3 1990); Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F. 2d 542 (CA9 1991).

Things changed, however, with United States v. Burke, supra. In that case, the Court of Appeals, relying on Threlkeld, held that race discrimination violative of Title VII infringes upon a victim's personal rights and thus that damages received therefrom are properly excludable under § 104(a)(2). Agreeing that discrimination violates personal rights, this Court nevertheless reversed because the statutory remedies do not "recompense a Title VII plaintiff for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential damages (e. g., a ruined credit rating)." 504 U. S., at 239.

I dissented from the Court's decision in Burke because "the remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs do not fix the

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