Cite as: 515 U. S. 347 (1995)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
cases accordingly, courts can give proper effect to the remedial scheme Congress has created for injured maritime workers.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.
The majority has reached the odd conclusion that a maritime engineer, injured aboard ship on the high seas while performing his duties as an employee of the ship, might not be a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act. This decision is unprecedented. It ignores the critical distinction between work performed aboard ship during a voyage— when the members of the crew encounter "the perils of the sea"—and maritime work performed on a vessel moored to a dock in a safe harbor. In my judgment, an employee of the ship who is injured at sea in the course of his employment is always a "seaman." I would leave more ambiguous, shore-bound cases for another day. Accordingly, though I concur in the Court's disposition of this case, returning it to the District Court for a new trial, I disagree with the standard this Court directs the trial court to apply on remand.
I
The Jones Act,1 46 U. S. C. App. § 688, provides, in part, "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law." In this case, it is undisputed that respondent, Antonios Latsis, was injured in the course of his employment. When the injury occurred, he was on board the steamship Galileo, a vessel in navigation in the Atlantic Ocean. He was therefore exposed to the perils of the sea; indeed, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, "his injury
1 The "Jones Act" is actually § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, 41 Stat. 1007.
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