Cite as: 515 U. S. 39 (1995)
Thomas, J., dissenting
"has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by [inexcusable] delay in its filing."
* * *
Under Peyton, we view consecutive sentences in the aggregate, not as discrete segments. Invalidation of Gar-lotte's marijuana conviction would advance the date of his eligibility for release from present incarceration. Garlotte's challenge, which will shorten his term of incarceration if he proves unconstitutionality, implicates the core purpose of habeas review. We therefore hold that Garlotte was "in custody" under his marijuana conviction when he filed his federal habeas petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
The Court concludes that a habeas petitioner may assert that he "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a), even when the petitioner admits that the conviction he wishes to challenge has expired. Because this construction of the habeas statute is neither required by our case law nor, more importantly, by the statute, I dissent.
In holding that Garlotte was in custody for his expired marijuana conviction, the Court relies heavily on Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54 (1968). There, petitioners wished to challenge sentences that they had not yet begun to serve, claiming that they were nevertheless "in custody" under these sentences. Overruling McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131 (1934), we held that such challenges could proceed. Practical considerations drove us to adopt a rule permitting early challenges to convictions. Allowing challenges to sentences that
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