Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 13 (1995)

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484

SANDIN v. CONNER

Opinion of the Court

may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S. 369 (1987). But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e. g., Vitek, 445 U. S., at 493 (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington, 494 U. S., at 221-222 (involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Conner asserts, incorrectly, that any state action taken for a punitive reason encroaches upon a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause even in the absence of any state regulation. Neither Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), nor Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), requires such a rule. Bell dealt with the interests of pretrial detainees and not convicted prisoners. See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 747 (1987) (distinguishing between "impermissible punishment" and "permissible regulation" of pretrial detainees). The Court in Bell correctly noted that a detainee "may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." 441 U. S., at 535. The Court expressed concern that a State would attempt to punish a detainee for the crime for which he was indicted via preconviction holding conditions. Id., at 539. Such a course would improperly extend the legitimate reasons for which such persons are detained—to ensure their presence at trial.6

6 Similar concerns drove the conclusion in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 (1963), holding that free citizens must receive procedural protections prior to revocation of citizenship for draft evasion. Without discussing "liberty interests," the Court recognized that deprivation of the "most precious right" of citizenship necessitated process by way of jury trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id., at 159. As in Bell, the Court feared the Government would enforce the criminal

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