Cite as: 515 U. S. 472 (1995)
Breyer, J., dissenting
(a) that certain specified acts shall constitute "high misconduct," Haw. Admin. Rule § 17-201-7a (1983) (emphasis added); (b) that misconduct punishable by more than four hours in disciplinary segregation "shall be punished" through a prison "adjustment committee" (composed of three unbiased members), §§ 17-201-12, 13; (c) that, when an inmate is charged with such misconduct, then (after notice and a hearing) "[a] finding of guilt shall be made" if the charged inmate admits guilt or the "charge is supported by substantial evidence," §§ 17-201-18(b), (b)(2); see §§ 17-201-16, 17; and (d) that the "[s]anctions" for high misconduct that "may be imposed as punishment . . . shall include . . . [d]isciplinary segregation up to thirty days," § 17-201-7(b).
The prison rules thus: (1) impose a punishment that is substantial, (2) restrict its imposition as a punishment to instances in which an inmate has committed a defined offense, and (3) prescribe nondiscretionary standards for determining whether or not an inmate committed that offense. Accordingly, under this Court's liberty-defining standards, imposing the punishment would "deprive" Conner of "liberty" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Compare Hewitt v. Helms, supra, at 471-472 (liberty interest created by regulations "requiring that . . . administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates"), with Thompson, 490 U. S., at 457, n. 2 (no liberty interest created by regulations which gave officials broad discretion to refuse a visit whenever "there are reasonable grounds to believe that," among other things, "[t]he visit will be detrimental to the inmate's rehabilitation"). Thus, under existing law, the Ninth Circuit correctly decided that the punishment deprived Conner of procedurally protected liberty and that the District Court should go on to decide whether or not the
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