National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 10 (1995)

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Cite as: 515 U. S. 582 (1995)

Opinion of the Court

ciple of comity which predated the Act [§ 1341] was not restricted by its passage"). After all, an injunction issued by a state court pursuant to § 1983 is just as disruptive as one entered by a federal court.

The availability of an adequate legal remedy renders a declaratory judgment unwarranted as well. In Great Lakes, we observed that "considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes . . . require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure." 319 U. S., at 299. The declaratory judgment procedure "may in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation is ended," ibid., and thus must be treated as being no less potentially disruptive than an injunction. See also Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S., at 408 ("[T]here is little practical difference between injunctive and declaratory relief"). Cf. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971) (holding that prohibition against enjoining pending state criminal proceedings applies to granting of declaratory relief). Declaratory relief in state tax cases might throw tax administration "into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We simply do not read § 1983 to provide for injunctive or declaratory relief against a state tax, either in federal or state court, when an adequate legal remedy exists.6

6 As our opinions reveal, there may be extraordinary circumstances under which injunctive or declaratory relief is available even when a legal remedy exists. For example, if the "enforcement of the tax would lead to a multiplicity of suits, or produce irreparable injury, [or] throw a cloud upon the title," equity might be invoked. Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871). As we have made clear, however, the multiplicity-of-suits rationale for permitting equitable relief extends only to those situations where there is a real risk of "numerous suits between the same parties, involving the same issues of law or fact." Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 530 (1932). Thus, if a state court awards a refund to a taxpayer on

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