594
Syllabus
2. Disclosure of a wiretap after its authorization expires violates § 2232(c), which provides criminal penalties for anyone who, "[1] having knowledge that a Federal . . . officer has been authorized or has applied for authorization . . . to intercept a wire . . . communication, [2] in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception, [3] gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any person." Contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding, the statutory language does not require that the wiretap application or authorization be pending or in esse at the time of the disclosure. Such a narrow purpose is not evidenced by the term "such interception" in the statute's second clause, which merely establishes that the defendant must intend to obstruct the interception made pursuant to the application or authorization of which he has the knowledge required by the first clause. Similarly, the phrase "possible interception" in the third clause was not designed to limit the punishable offense to cases where the interception was factually "possible," but was intended to recognize the fact that at the time the prohibited notice was given it very likely could not be known whether or not there would be an interception. Moreover, without the word "possible," the statute would only prohibit giving notice of "the interception": It would not reach the giving of notice of an application which has not yet resulted in an authorization or an authorization which has not yet resulted in an interception. Finally, the statute need not be read to exclude disclosures of expired wiretaps because of concern that a broader construction would run counter to the First Amendment. The Government's interest in nondisclosure by officials in sensitive confidential positions is quite sufficient to justify the construction of the statute as written, without any artificial narrowing because of First Amendment concerns. Pp. 602-606.
21 F. 3d 1475, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, in Part I of which Stevens, J., joined, and in all but Part I and the last paragraph of Part II of which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 606. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 609.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Patty Merkamp Stemler.
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