Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 12 (1995)

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Cite as: 515 U. S. 618 (1995)

Opinion of the Court

mail solicitation in the immediate aftermath of accidents, unlike the rule at issue in Edenfield, targets a concrete, non-speculative harm.

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals determined that this case was governed squarely by Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U. S. 466 (1988). Making no mention of the Bar's study, the court concluded that " 'a targeted letter [does not] invade the recipient's privacy any more than does a substantively identical letter mailed at large. The invasion, if any, occurs when the lawyer discovers the recipient's legal affairs, not when he confronts the recipient with the discovery.' " 21 F. 3d, at 1044, quoting Shapero, supra, at 476. In many cases, the Court of Appeals explained, "this invasion of privacy will involve no more than reading the newspaper." 21 F. 3d, at 1044.

While some of Shapero's language might be read to support the Court of Appeals' interpretation, Shapero differs in several fundamental respects from the case before us. First and foremost, Shapero's treatment of privacy was casual. Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, post, at 637-638, the State in Shapero did not seek to justify its regulation as a measure undertaken to prevent lawyers' invasions of privacy interests. See generally Brief for Respondent in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., O. T. 1987, No. 87-16. Rather, the State focused exclusively on the special dangers of over-reaching inhering in targeted solicitations. Ibid. Second, in contrast to this case, Shapero dealt with a broad ban on all direct-mail solicitations, whatever the time frame and whoever the recipient. Finally, the State in Shapero assembled no evidence attempting to demonstrate any actual harm caused by targeted direct mail. The Court rejected the State's effort to justify a prophylactic ban on the basis of blanket, untested assertions of undue influence and over-reaching. 486 U. S., at 475. Because the State did not make a privacy-based argument at all, its empirical showing on that issue was similarly infirm.

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