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Court has found, and the Court of Appeals has affirmed, that the case involved no interdistrict violation that would support interdistrict relief. See, e. g., Jenkins, supra, at 37, n. 3. The District Court has devised a remedy to accomplish indirectly what it admittedly lacks the remedial authority to mandate directly: the interdistrict transfer of students. See Milliken, 418 U. S., at 745. The record does not support the District Court's reliance on "white flight" as a justification for a permissible expansion of its intradistrict remedial authority through its pursuit of desegregative attractiveness. See, e. g., id., at 746. Moreover, that pursuit cannot be reconciled with this Court's decisions placing limitations on a district court's remedial authority. See, e. g., ibid. Nor are there appropriate limits to the duration of the District Court's involvement. See, e. g., Freeman, supra, at 489. Thus, the District Court's pursuit of the goal of "desegregative attractiveness" results in too many imponderables and is too far removed from the task of eliminating the racial identifiability of the schools within the KCMSD. Pp. 89-100. (c) Similarly, the order requiring the State to continue to fund the quality education programs cannot be sustained. Whether or not KCMSD student achievement levels are still "at or below national norms at many grade levels" clearly is not the appropriate test for deciding whether a previously segregated district has achieved partially unitary status. The District Court should sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance on this factor in reconsidering its order, and should instead apply the three-part Freeman test. It should bear in mind that the State's role with respect to the quality education programs has been limited to the funding, not the implementation, of those programs; that many of the goals of the quality education plan already have been attained; and that its end purpose is not only to remedy the violation to the extent practicable, but also to restore control to state and local authorities. Pp. 100-102.
11 F. 3d 755 (first case) and 13 F. 3d 1170 (second case), reversed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., post, p. 103, and Thomas, J., post, p. 114, filed concurring opinions. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 138. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 175.
John R. Munich, Chief Counsel for Litigation, argued the cause for petitioners State of Missouri et al. With him on the briefs were Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, James R. Layton, Michael J. Fields, and Bart A. Matanic,
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