Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 34 (1995)

Page:   Index   Previous  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  Next

720

BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAPTER, COMMUNITIES FOR GREAT ORE.

Scalia, J., dissenting

all affirmative acts (the provision itself describes them as "conduct," see § 1532(19)) which are directed immediately and intentionally against a particular animal—not acts or omissions that indirectly and accidentally cause injury to a population of animals. The Court points out that several of the words ("harass," "pursue," "wound," and "kill") "refer to actions or effects that do not require direct applications of force." Ante, at 701 (emphasis added). That is true enough, but force is not the point. Even "taking" activities in the narrowest sense, activities traditionally engaged in by hunters and trappers, do not all consist of direct applications of force; pursuit and harassment are part of the business of "taking" the prey even before it has been touched. What the nine other words in § 1532(19) have in common—and share with the narrower meaning of "harm" described above, but not with the Secretary's ruthless dilation of the word— is the sense of affirmative conduct intentionally directed against a particular animal or animals.

I am not the first to notice this fact, or to draw the conclusion that it compels. In 1981 the Solicitor of the Fish and Wildlife Service delivered a legal opinion on § 1532(19) that is in complete agreement with my reading:

"The Act's definition of 'take' contains a list of actions that illustrate the intended scope of the term . . . . With the possible exception of 'harm,' these terms all represent forms of conduct that are directed against and likely to injure or kill individual wildlife. Under the principle of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, . . . the term 'harm' should be interpreted to include only those actions that are directed against, and likely to injure or kill, individual wildlife." Memorandum of Apr. 17, reprinted in 46 Fed. Reg. 29490, 29491 (1981) (emphasis in original).

I would call it noscitur a sociis, but the principle is much the same: The fact that "several items in a list share an attribute

Page:   Index   Previous  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007