Cite as: 515 U. S. 753 (1995)
Syllabus
(a) The endorsement test supplies an appropriate standard for determining whether governmental practices relating to speech on religious topics violate the Establishment Clause, even where a neutral state policy toward private religious speech in a public forum is at issue. Cf., e. g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 395. There is no necessity to carve out, as does the plurality opinion, an exception to the test for the public forum context. Pp. 773-778. (b) On the facts of this case, the reasonable observer would not fairly interpret the State's tolerance of the Klan's religious display as an endorsement of religion. See, e. g., Lamb's Chapel, supra, at 395. In this context, the "reasonable observer" is the personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the collective social judgment, whose knowledge is not limited to information gleaned from viewing the challenged display, but extends to the general history of the place in which the display appears. In this case, therefore, such an observer may properly be held, not simply to knowledge that the cross is purely a religious symbol, that Capitol Square is owned by the State, and that the seat of state government is nearby, but also to an awareness that the square is a public space in which a multiplicity of secular and religious groups engage in expressive conduct, as well as to an ability to read and understand the disclaimer that the Klan offered to include in its display. Pp. 778-782.
Justice Souter, joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer, concluded that, given the available alternatives, the Board cannot claim that its denial of the Klan's application was a narrowly tailored response necessary to ensure that the State did not appear to take a position on questions of religious belief. Pp. 783-794. (a) The plurality's per se rule would be an exception to the endorsement test, not previously recognized and out of square with this Court's precedents. As the plurality admits, there are some circumstances in which an intelligent observer would reasonably perceive private religious expression in a public forum to imply the government's endorsement of religion. Such perceptions should be attributed to the reasonable observer of Establishment Clause analysis under the Court's decisions, see, e. g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 630, 635-636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), which have looked to the specific circumstances of the private religious speech and the public forum to determine whether there is any realistic danger that such an observer would think that the government was endorsing religion, see, e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 692, 694 (O'Connor,
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