Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 93 (1995)

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Cite as: 515 U. S. 70 (1995)

Opinion of the Court

the determination of a question "is essential to the correct disposition of the other issues in the case, we shall treat it as 'fairly comprised' by the questions presented in the petition for certiorari"); cf. Yee, supra, at 536-537.

Justice Souter argues that our decision to review the scope of the District Court's remedial authority is both unfair and imprudent. Post, at 147. He claims that factors such as our failure to grant certiorari on the State's challenge to the District Court's remedial authority in 1988 "lulled [respondents] into addressing the case without sufficient attention to the foundational issue, and their lack of attention has now infected the Court's decision." Post, at 139. Justice Souter concludes that we have "decide[d] the issue without any warning to respondents." Post, at 147. These arguments are incorrect.

Of course, "[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times." United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490 (1923). A fortiori, far from lulling respondents into a false sense of security, our previous decision in Jenkins v. Missouri put respondents on notice that the Court had not affirmed the validity of the District Court's remedy, 495 U. S., at 53, and that at least four Justices of the Court questioned that remedy, id., at 75-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

With respect to the specific orders at issue here, the State has once again challenged the scope of the District Court's remedial authority. The District Court was aware of this fact. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A-86 ("The State claims that the Court should not approve desegregation funding for salaries because such funding would be beyond the scope of the Court's remedial authority") (District Court's June 25, 1992, order); id., at A-97 ("The State has argued repeatedly and currently on appeal that the salary component is not a valid component of the desegregation remedy") (District

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