Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 5 (1995)

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128

THINGS REMEMBERED, INC. v. PETRARCA

Opinion of the Court

diction to entertain an appeal of the remand order under § 1447(d).

Section 1447(d) bars appellate review of the remand order in this case. As noted, § 1447(d) precludes appellate review of any order "remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed." The parties do not dispute that the District Court's order remanded this case to the Ohio state court from which it came. There is also no dispute that the District Court remanded this case on grounds of untimely removal, precisely the type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c).3 Section 1447(d) thus compels the conclusion that the District Court's order is "not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." See Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 430 U. S. 723 (1977) (per curiam).

We reach the same conclusion regardless of whether removal was effected pursuant to § 1441(a) or § 1452(a). Section 1447(d) applies "not only to remand orders made in suits removed under [the general removal statute], but to orders of remand made in cases removed under any other statutes, as well." United States v. Rice, 327 U. S. 742, 752 (1946) (emphasis added).4 Absent a clear statutory command to the contrary, we assume that Congress is "aware of the universality of th[e] practice" of denying appellate review of remand orders when Congress creates a new ground for removal. Ibid.

3 Section 1447(c) requires that a motion to remand for a defect in removal procedure be filed within 30 days of removal. Petitioner removed this case to federal court on September 25, 1992. Respondent filed motions to remand in the District Court on October 23, 1992, and in the Bankruptcy Court on November 25, 1992. Respondent's motion to remand filed in the District Court was sufficient to bring this case within the coverage of § 1447(c).

4 Rice interpreted the predecessor statute to § 1447(d). The current version of § 1447(d) is a recodification of the provision reviewed in Rice and is "intended to restate the prior law with respect to remand orders and their reviewability." Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 349-350 (1976).

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