Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 7 (1995)

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Cite as: 516 U. S. 137 (1995)

Opinion of the Court

firearm." Petitioners argue that "use" signifies active employment of a firearm. The Government opposes that definition and defends the proximity and accessibility test adopted by the Court of Appeals. We agree with petitioners, and hold that § 924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.

This action is not the first one in which the Court has grappled with the proper understanding of "use" in § 924(c)(1). In Smith, we faced the question whether the barter of a gun for drugs was a "use," and concluded that it was. Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223 (1993). As the debate in Smith illustrated, the word "use" poses some interpretational difficulties because of the different meanings attributable to it. Consider the paradoxical statement: "I use a gun to protect my house, but I've never had to use it." "Use" draws meaning from its context, and we will look not only to the word itself, but also to the statute and the sentencing scheme, to determine the meaning Congress intended.

We agree with the majority below that "use" must connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense. See 36 F. 3d, at 109; accord, United States v. Castro-Lara, supra, at 983; United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F. 2d 587, 597-598 (CA3 1989); United States v. Wilson, 884 F. 2d 174, 177 (CA5 1989). Had Congress intended possession alone to trigger liability under § 924(c)(1), it easily could have so provided. This obvious conclusion is supported by the frequent use of the term "possess" in the gun-crime statutes to describe prohibited gun-related conduct. See, e. g., §§ 922(g), 922( j), 922(k), 922(o)(1), 930(a), 930(b).

Where the Court of Appeals erred was not in its conclusion that "use" means more than mere possession, but in its standard for evaluating whether the involvement of a firearm amounted to something more than mere possession. Its

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