Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 14 (1996)

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Cite as: 516 U. S. 264 (1996)

Stevens, J., concurring

intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly regarded as the intent of the entire Congress.

In this case, as the Court and Justice Scalia agree, ante, at 273-274, post, at 282, the statutory text of § 4010 supports petitioner's construction of the Act. However, the placement of the authorization for interbank litigation in subsection (f) rather than subsection (a) lends some support to the Court of Appeals' interpretation. When Congress creates a cause of action, the provisions describing the new substantive rights and liabilities typically precede the provisions describing enforcement procedures; subsection (f) does not conform to this pattern. The drafting history, however, provides a completely satisfactory explanation for this apparent anomaly in the text.

Justice Scalia nevertheless views the Court's reference to this history as unwise. As he correctly notes, the simultaneous removal of the provision for interbank liability from subsection (a) and the addition of a new subsection (f) support another inference favoring the Court of Appeals' construction of the statute: that the drafters intended to relegate the resolution of interbank disputes to a different tribunal. Justice Scalia is mistaken, however, in believing that this inference provides the "most plausible explanation" for the change, ibid. In my judgment the Court has correctly concluded that the most logical explanation for the change is a decision to consolidate the aspects of § 4010 that relate to interbank disputes—liability limits and rulemaking authority—in the same subsection. Ante, at 273. Thus, the net result of the inquiry into drafting history is to find the answer to an otherwise puzzling aspect of the statutory text.

I must also take exception to Justice Scalia's psychoanalysis of judges who examine legislative history when construing statutes. He confidently asserts that we use such history as a makeweight after reaching a conclusion on the

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